Belief in evolved belief systems stems from using a population-genetic model of evolution that misconstrues the developmental relationship between genes and behaviour, confuses notions of “adapted” and “adaptive,” and ignores the fundamental role of language in the development of human beliefs. We suggest that theories about the evolution of belief would be better grounded in a developmental model of evolution.

We examined the development of children's understanding of beliefs and emotions in relation to parental talk about the psychological world. We considered the relations between parent–child talk about the emotions of characters depicted in a picture book, false belief understanding and emotion understanding. Seventy-eight primarily Caucasian and middle-class parents and their 3- to 5-year-old children participated (half boys and half girls). The emotions talked about were relatively simple, but the complexity of the situation varied in terms of whether or not (...) an understanding of beliefs was required to understand the emotion. Talk about the belief-dependent aspects of the emotions of picture book characters predicted children's false belief understanding, whereas talk about non-belief-dependent aspects of these emotions predicted children's emotion understanding. We argue that these data suggest that the development of children's understanding of beliefs and emotions is intertwined with learning to talk about the psychological world. (shrink)

Explaining the causal origins of what are taken to be uniquely human capacities for understanding the mind in the first years of life is a primary goal of social cognitive development research, which concerns so called “theory of mind” or “mindreading” skills. We review and discuss particular examples of this research in the context of its underlying evolutionary conceptual framework known as the neo-Darwinian modern synthesis. It is increasingly recognized that the modern synthesis is limited in its neglect of developmental (...) issues. A recent convergence of work from diverse sources, including but not limited to evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo) and developmental systems approaches, demonstrate the need for a developmental expansion of modern evolutionary theory. We attempt to show that not only are nativist explanations of early human social cognition vulnerable to the criticisms of this developmental shift in thinking, but that these criticisms also problematize the dominant and more mainstream theories in early social cognitive development research. We conclude by discussing the importance of developmental analysis in understanding the ontogeny of cognitive capacities in individuals as well as species. (shrink)

The ability to take others’ perspectives on the self has important psychological implications. Yet the logically and developmentally prior question is how children develop the capacity to take others’ perspectives. We discuss the development of joint attention in infancy as a rudimentary form of perspective taking and critique examples of biological and individualistic approaches to the development of joint attention. As an alternative, we present an activity-based relational perspective according to which infants develop the capacity to coordinate attention with others (...) by differentiating the perspectives of self and other from shared activity. Joint attention is then closely related to language development, which makes further social development possible. We argue that the ability to take the perspective of others on the self gives rise to the possibility of language, rationality and culture. (shrink)

The ability to take others’ perspectives on the self has important psychological implications. Yet the logically and developmentally prior question is how children develop the capacity to take others’ perspectives. We discuss the development of joint attention in infancy as a rudimentary form of perspective taking and critique examples of biological and individualistic approaches to the development of joint attention. As an alternative, we present an activity-based relational perspective according to which infants develop the capacity to coordinate attention with others (...) by differentiating the perspectives of self and other from shared activity. Joint attention is then closely related to language development, which makes further social development possible. We argue that the ability to take the perspective of others on the self gives rise to the possibility of language, rationality and culture. (shrink)

Uchiyama et al. provide a compelling analysis of cultural influences on estimates of the genetic contribution to psychological and behavioral traits. Their focus is on the relevance of their arguments for behavioral genetics and their work resonates with other contemporary approaches that emphasize extra-genetic influences on phenotype. I extend their analysis to consider its relevance for evolutionary psychology.

We provide a historical and philosophical review of the main theories of concepts that implicitly or explicitly ground the various senses of the concept “concept” in psychology and related sciences, highlighting their respective strengths and limitations. We then consider these theories in terms of their ontology and epistemology . This is followed by a brief summary of more current treatments and conceptualizations of concepts within psychology that seem linked, at least to some extent, by a general “received view” of sorts, (...) according to which concepts are in some way “in the head.” We contrast this received view with a linguistic construal of concepts, according to which concepts are inextricably bound up with the terms in which they are expressed. We conclude with a consideration of the implications of the foregoing for concept research in psychology by conducting an ordinary language analysis of the concept “concept.” 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

In this article, we respond in general and specific terms to the commentaries written on our target article . In so doing, we revisit the motivation for our initial article and attempt to clarify certain aspects of our argument. Given that we were taken by some to be trying to undermine the Representational Theory of Mind , we discuss RTM in some detail. We also discuss Wittgenstein's methods and their relevance to the issues raised in our article and in the (...) commentaries. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Applying a non-developmental evolutionary metatheory to understanding the evolution of psychological capacities leads to the creation of models that mischaracterize developmental processes, misattribute genes as the source of developmental information, and ignore the myriad developmental and contextual factors involved in human decision-making. Using an evolutionary systems perspective, we argue that revenge and forgiveness cannot be understood apart from the development of foundational human psychological capacities and the contexts under which they develop.